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PAROCHIAL SCHOOL AID: A PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
It is the thesis of this note that any form of public aid that may
be determinative of the continued operations of parochial education at the
elementary and secondary levels will be held invalid by the United States
Supreme Court on the ground that such aid would result in sponsorship
and active involvement of the state in the activities of church-related
schools. The frame of reference to be adopted in determining the consti-
tutionality of the various programs proposed by the states is that of the
public perspective, "the one most appropriate for judging governmental
action."1  Aid that runs the risk of identifying the state with a school
whose very nature is religious will be held to offend the first amendment.
In developing this thesis, the note will survey the perspective taken by
both the legislatures and the Court in the area of aid to parochial educa-
tion, tracing the development of standards from Everson v. Board of tdu.
cation2 to Ifalz v. Tax Commission. Next, the more recent opinions
of Lemon v. Kurtzman4 and Tilton v. Richardsonr will be discussed to
demonstrate the Supreme Court's new perception of the nature of paro-
chial schools as vehicles of religious indoctrination and to point out the
restrictive nature of the Establishment Clause standard. The note will
then focus on the confused and uncertain application of the Lemon stan-
dard by lower courts in challenges to Ohio's parental grant, tax credit,
and auxiliary services programs. Committee for Public Education andi
Religious Liberty v. NyquistO will be discussed to illustrate the recent
refinement of the Court's perspective and the resultant position that
any substantial aid which risks identifying the state with the basic edu-
cational process of the parochial school will be held to be invalid. Finally,
the refined standard will be applied to the current challenge to Ohio's
auxiliary services and materials program and the supplementary appro-
priations thereto. The note concludes that public aid, if it is truly auxil-
iary to the purposes of parochial education, will not result in public iden-
tification of the state with the religious purposes of parochial schools and
should, therefore, meet the requirements of the Establishment Clause test.
1 Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part A,
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L REv. 513, 534 (1968).
2 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
4 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
6 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS
A. The Theoretical Perspective
The Establishment Clause7 is based upon the proposition that any
union of government and religion "tends to destroy government and to
degrade religion." In the classic sense, a state establishment of religion
involves the creation of a single, state-supported church. However, the
present constitutional standard prohibits even those acts of government
which, while not actually establishing religion, merely tend towards that
result. "A given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless
be one 'respecting' that end in the sense of being a step that could lead
to such establishment and hence offend the First Amendment."'  This
stricter constitutional prohibition is intended to provide protection against
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity."'1
However, while the Constitution prohibits governmental establish-
ment of religion, it also guarantees to its citizens the right of free exer-
cise of religion. Hence, there arises within the first amendment an inher-
ent tension,'1 which has been recognized by the Supreme Court:
[A state] cannot consistently with the ... First Amendment contribute
tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets
and faith of any church. On the other hand, other language of the
amendment commands that [a state] cannot hamper its citizens in the
free exercise of their own religion.' 2
The separation between church and state is not complete:
It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a re-
gime of total separation, and as a consequence cases arising under these
Clauses have presented some of the most perplexing questions to come
before this Court .... As a result of these decisions and opinions, it may
no longer be said that the Religion Clauses are free of 'entangling' pre-
cedents.13
7
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof..... U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Religion Clauses were recognized
as binding upon the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
8 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
9 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (emphasis in the original).
1 0 Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
1 Several theories have been advanced as attempts to resolve this dilemma. See generally
P. KURLAND, RELiGION AND THE LAW (1962); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablih-
ment, and Doctrinal Development: Part H. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 513 (1968); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value,
77 YALE LJ. 692 (1968).
12 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
13 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760-61
(1973).
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As a general principle to be followed by government when acting in
areas involving religion, the Supreme Court has required that all such
action be taken in an attitude of neutrality, i.e., one neither advancing
nor prohibiting religion.' In practice, however, this requirement of neu-
trality has not consistently afforded a workable guideline to state legisla-
tures. "[Tihe fact is that while in many contexts the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause fully complement each other, there
are areas in which a doctrinaire reading of the Establishment Clause leads
to irreconcilable conflict with the Free Exercise Clause."' 5 One such area
has been that of public aid to parochial school education.
B. The Legislative Perspective
Because a substantial percentage of nonpublic schools are conducted
under the auspices of churches,. many legislatures have come to regard
the Establishment Clause as an obstacle to state attempts to render aid
to these church-related schools."7 By the end of the 1960's, the increas-
ing costs of education coupled with a marked decline in the number of
religious faculty available to serve at reduced salaries18 appeared to threat-
en the very existence of the church-related parochial schools. 10  What
at first was only a parochial school problem very quickly became a prob-
lem both for the states and for the local school districts. The parochial
school system had, after all, long been valued as a source of diversity
'
4 Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
l6 Approximately ninety-eight per cent of Ohio's nonpublic school enrollment attends
denominational schools. Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
17 However, private, non-sectarian schools have also felt the effect of the Establishment
Clause since legislation authorizing state aid to nonpublic schools usually contains no Severn.
bility clause as to those institutions. "Therefore the maxim of de ninimis ion cural lox
is applicable. Ohio's private, non-sectarian school students have no rights under a
statute which is unconstitutional as applied to ninety-eight per cent of its affected class,"
Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 420 n.27 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
18 Since teachers' salaries represent about seventy per cent of a typical public school
budget, religious personnel subsidize the cost of religious education. J. Dillehay, L. Frueh,
R. Stevens, J. Treacy, An Analysis by Ohio County of the Financial Effects of the 1972
State Foundation Program (H.B. 475) Assuming Non-Shifting and Shifting of Non.Public
Pupils, FEG Report No. PS101, at 10 (Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio 45431) there-
inafter cited as Ohio County Analysis]. Currently, sixty.one per cent of school costs In
parochial elementary and high schools are spent in instructional salaries. In private schools,
where religious communities provide more of the staff, salaries account for some fifty-three
per cent of the total cost. National Catholic Educational Association, U.S. Catholic Schools:
1972-73, at 16.
19 "Nonpublic school enrollment has dropped at the rate of six per cent per year for the
past five years .... Projected to 1980, it is estimated that seven States [included within those
seven is Ohio] will lose 1,416,122 nonpublic school students." Committee for Pub, Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 817 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
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in a pluralistic society.20 State legislatures, confronted with rising costs
of their own- ' and with an influx of students unable to pay the increased
parochial school tuition, sought to provide relief to church-related
schools22 in an attempt to ease the burden on the public system.
C. The Judicial Perspective: Everson to W/alz
Until the recent period of financial crisis, the Supreme Court at-
tempted to achieve governmental neutrality towards religion by requiring
that legislation have both a secular purpose and a primary effect not
advancing religion. This standard permitted a few instances of state aid
in areas more or less incidental to the educational process of nonpublic
schools. Everson v. Board of Education2 upheld a New Jersey statute4
providing reimbursement, to parents of public and nonpublic school chil-
dren alike, of money expended for transportation to and from school.
In holding that the first amendment presented no obstacle to state ex-
penditures of tax-raised funds as a part of a general program of public
welfare benefits, the Court noted that the indirect benefit realized by the
parochial schools25 was the same as that already realized through the
admittedly permissible provision by the state of other public services. The
opinion emphasized the position of neutrality properly to be taken by
government in pointing out that although equality of treatment is not re-
quired, state power is no more to be used to handicap religions than
it is to favor them."
However, Mr. Justice Douglas, one of the majority in Everson, later
expressed grave doubts about the decision: "Its result is appealing, as
it allows aid to be given to needy children. Yet by the same token,
public funds could be used to satisfy other needs of children in parochial
20 Id. at 773.
2 From 1958 to 1971, public school expenditures throughout the United States have
tripled to $43 billion, due primarily to an increase in total school population and to the
rapid increase in salaries and fringe benefits. These forces, however, have begun in recent
years to abate. Ohio County Analysis, supra note 18, at 15.
, 
2 2 It has been estimated, for example, that a total shift of Ohio's nonpublic pupils to
the state's public schools would generate additional costs of $295 million, the state bearing
under its current programs $177 million and the local school districts the remaining $118
million. Id. at 14.
23 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
24 18A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39-1 (Supp. 1973).
25 "It is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to church schools. There is
even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the church schools if
the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets when
transportation to a public school would have been paid for by the State." Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
26 Id. at 18.
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schools-lunches, books, and tuition being obvious examples." 7  His
fears were at least partially confirmed in Board of Education v, Allen, "
which upheld a New York statute authorizing the free loan of textbooks
to children of both public and nonpublic schools.2" The Court in Allen
applied the two-part standard expressed in Abington School District v.
Schemppa° as a means of achieving governmental neutrality towards reli-
gion: "[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."" The Court has since defined "primary
effect" to mean the "direct and immediate effect of advancing religion"
and not necessarily of first importance.8 2  The Court had long before re-
jected the "simplistic" notion of absolute prohibition of aid to religious
concerns, 33 and had recognized the secular relevance of religious inter-
ests.34  Therefore, after Allen, it could be strongly argued that state aid
which used secular means to achieve secular results without a substantial
religious impact upon sectarian school students was constitutional.
The Court in Everson declined to "strike hat state statute down if
it is within the State's constitutional power even though it approaches
the verge of that power."" The New York statute upheld in Allen
reached that verge, and the Court later sought a means of assuring that
future state action did not topple over. It found that means in lWalz
27 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
28 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
29N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1967). The state had already construecd
this statute as authorizing the loan of only secular textbooks. Board of Edue. v. Allen,
20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791 (1967). The United States Supreme Court had previously
held that the furnishing of secular textbooks to private school students was not violative
of due process under the fourteenth amendment as a use of tax funds for a private purpose.
Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The Establishment Clause
was not involved in this decision since it had not yet been held that the clause was bind-
ing upon the states through the fourteenth amendment.
30 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
31 Id. at 222.
82 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 784 n-39
(1973). See also Mr. Justice White's dissent at 823. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971), held unconstitutional one provision of the Higher Educational Facilities Act of 1963,
20 U.S.C. §§ 701-721 (1965-69 Supp. V). The invalidated provision prohibited the sec-
tarian use of federally financed facilities for a period of twenty years. 20 U.S.C. § 751 (a)(C),
(D) (1965-69 Supp. V). The Court found that section to have the effect of advancing
religion after twenty years, despite the congressional determination that, after that time, the
federal government would have obtained a secular benefit equal to or exceeding any religious
value obtained through the grant. 20 U.S.C. § 754 (1965-69 Supp. V). Thus the Court
made dear that the unconstitutional primary effect need not be foremost.
33 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
34 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
35 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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v. Tax Commission,"6 where the majority tentatively announced and ex-
plored the concept of excessive entanglement and political strife which
Mr. Justice Douglas first mentioned in his dissent to Allen.37
In Walz, the Court held that an exemption from property tax3e
granted to church property used for worship was not violative of the
Establishment Clause. The Court stated that the position of "benevolent
neutrality" properly to be adopted by government in order to avoid spon-
sorship of or interference with religion allowed "room for play in the
joints." 9 The exemption was found to be predominantly neutral in its
design to foster not solely churches but also an entire class of institutions
whose functions are beneficial to the general community. Emphasis was
also placed upon the fact that the exemption was nearly two centuries
old and that it had not to that point resulted in an establishment of
a state religion. In considering the effect of declaring the exemption
unconstitutional, the Court perceived a danger of excessive entanglement
with religion if the government should have to foreclose on church prop-
erty. Thus the holding in Walz may be seen as illustrative of the inher-
ent tension within the Religion Clauses and the consequent conflicting
values confronting the state-and the Court. The decision is in part
an effort to minimize any entanglement of church and state and in part
an effort to avoid reversing nearly two hundred years of history, for such
a reversal could only be characterized as a newly-developed hostility to-
wards religion.
III. Lemon AND Tilton: THE NEW PERSPECTIVE
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,40 the Supreme Court, fearing that what is
today "a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent,"'
formally incorporated the excessive entanglement concept into the Estab-
lishment Clause test.42 Lemon involved challenges ' to Rhode Island
36 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
37 392 U.S. at 265 (footnote omitted):
The initiative to select and requisition "the books desired" is with the parochl
school. Powerful religious-political pressures will therefore be on the state agendes
to provide the books that are desired.
These then are the battlegrounds where control of text book distribution will
be won or lost. Now that "secular" textbooks will pour into religious schools, we
can rest assured that a contest will be on to provide those books for religious
schools which the dominant religious group concludes best reflect the theocentric
or other philosophy of the particular church.
3 8 N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
9 Waz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
40 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4 1 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,225 (1963).42 It is interesting to note, however, that while the concept of entanglement in Wllz
1974]
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and Pennsylvania statutes which provided salary supplements to teachers
of secular subjects in nonpublic schools. The Rhode Island Salary Sup-
plement Act44 authorized a supplement not in excess of fifteen per cent
of the teacher's current annual salary on the conditions that the teacher
use only those materials used in public schools and agree not to teach
courses in religion. Payment was to be made directly to the teacher.
The Pennsylvania Non-public Elementary and Secondary Education Act
authorized the "purchase" by state officials of specified "secular education-
al services" for nonpublic schools. 45  Reimbursement was to be made
directly to the contracting nonpublic schools for expenditures made for
salaries, textbooks, and instructional material used only in connection
with courses not containing sectarian teaching. A three-judge district
court found that the parochial school system in Rhode Island was "an
integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church. 4"0  On
this~basis, the aid was found to be invalid not because it assisted religious
teaching, but because it assisted in a variety of ways the maintenance
of an entire educational environment within which religious instruction
took place.
The United States Supreme Court in Lemon found the funding pro-
vided by both states to be unconstitutional on the ground of excessive
entanglement, arising both from the continuing state surveillance neces-
sary to ensure that statutory restrictions are obeyed and from the state
inspection of school records necessary to implement the programs. In
the majority opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Burger did not define excessive
entanglement, but rather set out factors to be considered in determining
the validity of legislative action: first, the character and purpose of the
institutions benefited; second, the nature of the aid provided; and, third,
the resulting relationship between the government and the religious insti-
tution.47 Because the Court relied upon the Rhode Island district court's
findings as to the religious nature of the schools involved,"8 it found that
seemed to be an aspect of the concept of neutrality, the Court in Lemon made no mention
of neutrality.
43Di Censo v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970), Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 1'.
Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
44 R.I. GEN. LAwS ANN. §§ 16-51-1 through 16-51-9 (Supp. 1970).
4524 PA. STATS. ANN. §§ 5601-09 (Purdon Supp. 1973).
46Di Censo v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 117 (D.R.I. 1970). In Lemon v. Kurtzman,
310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D.Pa. 1969), a three-judge district court granted the state's motion
to'dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding no violation of the first amend-
ment.
47 403 U.S. at 615.
48 Although the complaint in Lemon contained certain allegations as to the nature of
the Pennsylvania parochial schools involved, there were no findings made as to their nature
since the complaint was dismissed. The Court adopted a "cavalier" approach, however,
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teacher salary subsidies, as a general proposition, substantially risked a
fostering of religion since "[r]eligious authority necessarily pervades the
school system" and a "conflict of functions inheres in the situation." 4'
Both statutes required certain administrative procedures designed to ex-
clude religion in those areas subsidized by the states. However, it was
precisely these attempts to guarantee secular use that would run a risk
of impermissible embroilment because "the cumulative impact of the en-
tire relationship ... involves excessive entanglement . .. ."50 In other
words, aid which resulted in an intimate relationship between the state
and the school created a risk that the public would identify the two as
one entity and thus was impermissible.
The Court spoke for the first time of the danger of the divisive polit-
ical potential inherent in the provision of state aid to parochial schools.
Advancing the "progression argument" of demands for increased aid not
found to be present in the facts of Wfalz,i 1 the majority saw a danger
of political fragmentation and controversy along religious lines:
Partisans of parochial schools, understandably concerned with rising costs
and sincerely dedicated to both the religious and secular educational mis-
sions of their schools, will inevitably champion this cause and promote
political action to achieve their goals. Those who oppose state aid,
whether for constitutional, religious, or fiscal reasons, will inevitably re-
spond and employ all of the usual political campaign techniques to pre-
vail. Candidates will be forced to declare and voters to choose. -52
However, while pointing out the danger of divisiveness, the Court went
to great lengths to avoid condemnation of religious groups taking strong
positions on public issues. As a result, the concept of political divisive-
ness does not easily lend itself to analytical reasoning. While approving
political controversy along potentially religious lines in other contexts,"
in taking judicial notice of the fact that the Pennsylvania parochial schools were conducted
on the same basis as the trial court in Di Censo found the Rhode Island schools to be
conducted. Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and The Sweet of Church-State En-
tanglement, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 147, 167 (1971).
49 403 U.S. at 617.
50 Id. at 614.
51 Id. at 624.
52 Id. at 622.
53 Inasmuch as religion is an element of society and of its culture, it can be expected
to be a factor in the political process. An element of religion was present, for example,
in the recent debates over the validity of anti-abortion statutes, and may, perhaps, be present
in opinion regarding the posture to be taken by the United States toward Israel. The
came political divisiveness argument could very easily have been made with respect to pro-
viding reimbursement for bus transportation and particularly to the loan of secular textbooks
to nonpublic school children in Everson and in Allen. The fact that the statutes in those
cases benefited both public and nonpublic school children, however, may weaken that argu-
ment.
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the Court provided no means of distinguishing healthy from unhealthy
political-religious activity. 4 Yet the concept can 'be seen as a natural
consequence of public identification of the state and the church-related
school.
The opinions in Tilton v. Richardson55 make clear that the Court
based its entanglement decision in Lemon upon a generalized notion of
the differences in educational purposes between church-related institutions
at the lower levels and those at the higher levels. In upholding certain
provisions of the Higher Educational Facilities Act of 196310 authorizing
federal grants arid loans to colleges and universities for the construction
of a wide variety of facilities, the Court noted that religious indoctrination
was not generally perceived to be a substantial purpose of the colleges
involved in the case. Further, institutions at the higher levels generally
foster an atmosphere of academic freedom where persons of all beliefs
are admitted to both the faculty and the student body. The plurality
in Tilton found little likelihood of religious permeation in secular activi-
ties; therefore, there was little need for excessive entangling governmen-
tal surveillance to ensure secular use. The Chief Justice did comment
that if a case were to appear before the Court involving a college whose
religious and secular functions were found to be inseparable, governmen-
tal aid to that institution might be set aside. 7 In Lemon, however, the
Court made no such provision for exceptions to be made with regard
to any particular elementary or secondary parochial school not conducted
in the manner in which the trial court found that the Rhode Island paro-
chial schools were conducted. 8 In addition, the Court in Tilton saw
no real danger of political divisiveness in the federal program, since the
grants involved no continuing financial relationship or annual re-evalua-
tion of appropriations.
Viewing Lemon and Tilton in retrospect, it may be said that entan-
glement, both administrative and political, appears to reach unacceptable
54 "[P]olitical debate and division, however vigorous and even partisan, are normal and
healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along
religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended
to protect." 403 U.S. at 622.
55 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
50 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-721 (1970).
57403 U.S. at 682.
58 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyqvist, 413 U.S. 756, 824 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting).
At the very least I would not strike down these statutes on their face. The Court's
opinion emphasizes a particular kind of parochial school, one restricted to students
of particular religious beliefs and conditioning attendance on religious study. Con-
cededly, there are many parochial schools that do not impose such restrictions.
Where they do not, it is even more difficult for me to understand why the primary
effect of these statutes is to advance religion.
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proportions only in the context of aid to elementary and secondary
schools. "[The two cases] are grounded on the proposition that the de-
gree of entanglement . . . varies in large measure with the extent to
which religion permeates the institution."' 9 Since the Court found in
Tilton that religion does not generally permeate church-related institu-
tions of higher learning, it would appear that the entanglement test pre-
sen6i an obstacle only to state aid to elementary and secondary parochial
schools.6°
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF Lemon:
THE OHIO EXPERIENCE
The United States Supreme Court in Lemon established a tripartite
Establishment Clause test, the contours of which, as of 1971, were hazy.
The first prong of the test required that legislative enactments have a
secular purpose. Because parochial schools are seen to provide valuable
diversity to society and because of the economic effects upon the public
school systems presented by declining enrollments in parochial schools,
state aid programs are generally the result of legislative attempts to pre-
serve this diversity and the financial integrity of the public schools. There-
fore the secular purpose of such legislation is generally recognized.6'
The second prong of the Establishment Clause test requires that the
primary effect of the legislation not be the advancement of religion. "Aid
normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that
a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mis-
sion .... ,,62 The "flow" of such unconstitutional aid may be directly
to the schools involved, as that authorized by Pennsylvania's Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, or indirectly through the teach-
ers, as that authorized by Rhode Island's Salary Supplement Act. How-
ever, Lemon and its predecessors failed to establish fully the point at
59 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973).
60A further result of this new dimension to the constitutional prerequisites to valid
state aid was that state legislatures were faced with seemingly irreconcilable decisions. One
wonders, for example, whether a statute permitting the free loan of textbooks to nonpublic
school children, were it to come before the Court today, would satisfy the prohibition against
excessive entanglement
61 For this reason, the court in Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 411 n.13 (S.D.Ohio
1972), afJ'd, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), expressed its opinion that "the first prong of the Lemron
test will almost invariably be .atisfied . . . and may not truly exist as a distinct, disposi-
tive requirement." In Brusca v. Board of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275 (ED. Mo. 1971), aff'd.,
405 U.S. 1050 (1972), however, it was held that any attempt to amend Missouri's constitu-
tion prohibiting all aid to church-related schools would per se violate the Establishment
Clause for failure to meet the first prong of the Establishment Clause test. See also Reitmana
v. Mulky, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
62 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
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which state aid is to be characterized as having the primary effect of
advancing religion. Everson recognized the benefit realized by the
church-related school even through constitutionally valid state aid. Yet
Tilton made clear that the effect of advancing religion need not be fore-
most in order for aid to be held unconstitutional.
The third prong of the Establishment Clause test remained, as of
1971, the most nebulous. Lemon presented no workable definition of
entanglement nor did it specify the point at which that entanglement
became excessive. The Court in Lemon looked to the administrative sur-
veillance and to the fiscal auditing required to implement the legislative
programs and found that the cumulative impact of the relationship be-
tween church and state arising from such interaction offended the Estab-
lishment Clause. The risk of fragmentation of the body politic, perceived
to be a necessary consequence of such interaction, remained even less
clear. Why state subsidized transportation and provision of textbooks
was not seen to involve such risk in Everson and in Allen, but was so
perceived in the state subsidies of teacher salaries in Lemon is difficult
to say.65 Lemon, therefore, left the situation -with regard to alternative
forms of aid at the lower levels of parochial school education constitu-
tionally unclear.
Against this background in the fall of 1971, the General Assembly
of Ohio passed a statute,64 which, among other things, authorized pay-
ment to the various school districts for the purpose of reimbursing eligi-
ble parents of nonpublic school children for a portion of the expenses
incurred by them in the education of their children. 0 In order to qualify
for the grants, parents were required to submit applications containing
an assurance that they had actually spent on the nonpublic education
of their children an amount equal to the reimbursement sought. No
conditions or restrictions were placed upon the use of the funds granted.
The amount of the grants for the years 1971-73 was fixed at ninety
dollars per year per student. However, another statutory provision " spe-
cifically authorized periodic redetermination of that amount by the State
Board of Education.
0 3 The Court unconvincingly distinguished the teacher salary supplements involved In
Lemon from the loan of textbooks involved in Allen: "We cannot, however, refuse here
to recognize that teachers have a substantially different ideological character from books,
In terms of potential for involving some aspect of faith or morals in secular subjects, a
textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not." Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971). A teacher's "substantially different ideological char.
acter" is often expressed through the handling of the subject matter presented In textbooks,
64 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.062(D) (Page 1972).
05 Also instituted was an auxiliary services and materials program, discussed i/lra
06 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.02(D) (Page 1972).
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The Ohio legislature had gone to great lengths to avoid the entangle-
ment problems of Lemon. The new legislation specifically precluded
any administrative authority over the policy determinations, programs of
instruction or any other aspects of the operations of the nonpublic schools
involved. Further, the benefits were conferred directly upon the parents
of the school children rather than upon the schools themselves. The
parental grant program was soon challenged and a unanimous three-
judge district court held it to be unconstitutional in WVolman v. Essex."
As a preliminary step in its analysis of the legislative scheme, the
court in Wolman took due, if only formal, notice of the secular purposes
of the statute."8 The court then considered the three factors set out in
Lemon to determine the validity of this statutory scheme. 9  In determin-
ing the character and purpose of the beneficiaries of the program, the
court distinguished this program from instances of constitutional aid pro-
vided to children of public and nonpublic schools alike. Although the
grants were directed to parents rather than to schools, the court found
that the limited nature of the class affected and the fact that one religious
group so predominated that class made suspect the neutrality of the stat-
ute.7
0
[Mierely because the class to which the statute is directed is small and
sectarian is not grounds for holding it unconstitutional per se on neutral-
ity doctrine grounds, but such determination may dictate an additional
inquiry .... A review of the cases seems to indicate that "neutrality"
and "entanglement" exist in an inverse relationship to each other: where
there is little evidence that a statute has a predominantly neutral pur-
pose and effect, as where the affected class is small or predominantly sec-
tarian, courts have scrutinized the statute to see if it engenders excessive
entanglement .... Conversely, where the indicia of neutrality are high,
as in Wa/z, . . . because the affected class is broad and internally plural-
istic, the inquiry into entanglement has been less strict.71
The court held that, upon close scrutiny, the distinction between public
moneys for general educational purposes directed to schools and the same
moneys directed to parents of students in those schools was no distinction
at all. The parents were mere conduits of public funds to parochial
67342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio 1972), af'd., 409 U.S. 808 (1972). For cases dealing
with similar programs see Opinion of the Justices, 357 Mfass. 846, 259 N.F.2d 564 (1970);
Harness v. Patterson, 255 S.C. 503, 179 S.B.2d 907 (1971); Swart v. South Burlington
School Dist., 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514 (1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961).
68342 F. Supp. at 411 n.13.
69 403 U.S. at 615.
70 342 F. Supp. at 412.
71Id. at 413.
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schools, and these latter were the true beneficiaries of Ohio's legislative
program.72
Although the parties, through counsel, supplied the court with stipu-
lations pertaining to the Catholic school system in Ohio,78 the court ap-
parently placed great weight upon the definition of a Catholic school
contained in the Administrative Regulations of the Diocese of Columbus:
"The inclusion of religion in the curriculum is the deciding factor in
the Church's and the Catholic parents' decision to erect schools where
the integrity of all subject matter can be maintained in an atmosphere
of Christian thought. ' 74  Thus the court concluded that nonpublic sec-
tarian schools in Ohio, beneficiaries of the parental grant program, retain
a substantial religious character.y
Having determined the character and purpose of the institutions bene-
fited, the district court then directed its attention to the nature of the
aid provided. Because tuition to a parochial school forms a major por-
tion of the school's general fund, the court found that the lack of restric-
tions upon its use enabled the schools to use the money for any purpose
it deemed legitimate. The funds could, for example, ultimately find their
way to the construction of a chapel. The character of the religious
schools and the unrestricted nature of the aid provided would result, the
court found, in a relationship of continuing state surveillance of the par-
ticipating schools in order to ensure that the fumds would be used for
secular purposes. Such administrative surveillance would necessarily in-
volve excessive entanglement with the operation of the educational func-
tions of the school.
The court in Wolman misunderstood the tripartite character of the
Establishment Clause test enunciated in Lemon. It failed to realize that
the second prong of the test is to be considered separately from the exces-
sive entanglement question, and may itself be dispositive of the question
of constitutionality. The state programs at issue in Lemon met the pri-
mary effect requirement of the test, for, if properly effectuated, the au-
thorized aid would not, theoretically, advance the religious functions of
the parochial schools. Ensurance of the proper effectuation of those stat-
utes, however, would necessarily involve excessive entanglement with the
operation of the educational functions of the schools. Thus, while meet-
72Md at 416.
73Id. at 420-25.
74 Id. at 405. It is interesting to compare this with the attitude adopted by the Supreme
Court in Tilton: "MR. CHiEF JUSTIcE BURGER, for the plurality, concluded that despite
some institutional rhetoric, none of the four colleges was pervasively sectarian .... " Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
75 342 F. Supp. at 405.
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ing the first two prongs of the test, the programs dealt with in Lemon
failed to meet the third and were therefore found to be unconstitutional.
In trying to conform to Lemon, the district court in Wolman appar-
ently felt that the primary effect test no longer had constitutional force;
at the very least, it regarded the neutral primary effect requirement as
only a preliminary stage in evaluating the possible risk of entanglement.
The district court could logically have ended its analysis before reaching
the issue of entanglement and found that, since parents serve as conduits
of public funds to parochial schools, the absence of restrictions upon those
funds had a primary effect of advancing the sectarian functions of those
schools. Instead, the court, in a convoluted fashion, twisted itself around
to reach the entanglement objections.
In its discussions of possible political fragmentation resulting from
entanglement, the district court noted that non-entanglement "is not nec-
essarily assured when administrative activity by government is neutral;
participation of any sort by government in statutory programs affecting
religion would entangle it in the emotional currents that the Establish-
ment Clause is designed to avoid."716 In this statement, the district court
evidenced a willingness to accord to the political divisiveness argument
a greater weight than even the United States Supreme Court had given
it in Lemon. The court in Wolnan considered that a greater danger
of political fragmentation arose from direct subsidies than from tax ex-
emptions, b&cause subsidies must be passed upon periodically and thus
invite more political controversy than do exemptions. That danger was
fully present in the statutory scheme before the district court because
of the specific provision that the amount to be paid was to be periodically
determined by state officials.
In Kosydar v. Wolman,7 7 the same district court found constitutional
objection to tax exemptions. In this case, the court held unconstitutional
Ohio's tax credit program which reallocated the funds appropriated for
the tuition reimbursement program invalidated in Wolman. This second
scheme allowed a credit to a class of persons including the parents of
nonpublic school children for expenses in excess of that spent generally
by public school parents. The credit could not exceed their total tax
liability under state income, sales, personal property, excise, and real
property tax provisions, after other deductions. 'Where the credit allow-
76 Id. at 409. This would appear to be somewhat of an overstatement since the Supreme
Court has noted that the nation's history has not been one of entire separation of church
and state. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760
(1973).
77 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd sub non. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901
(1973).
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able exceeded the total state income tax liability, the parent would be
entitled to a refund payable out of a "tax refund rotary fund."78  Al-
though the program did not necessarily involve a transfer of state funds
to the parents, the court found objection in the fact that the program
provided relief solely because the recipients had expended money for non-
public school education:
"It simply defies reason to say that such a statute does not aid sectarian
schools. Such aid may be less direct and less capable of precise measure-
ment than a grant to the schools themselves; yet if some parents will
now be able to send their children to these schools or if fewer parents
already utilizing them will be forced to withdraw their children, they
will be aided." 79
In response to Wolman's objections to the restricted class of benefi-
ciaries, Ohio's General Assembly broadened the class of recipients eligible
for relief to include, among others, persons enrolled in home instruction
programs, in public adult high school continuation programs, in schools
for tubercular persons and basic literacy programs, and in programs for
the deaf, blind, crippled and emotionally handicapped. 0 The district
court in Kosydar was unimpressed with the class of beneficiaries as ex-
panded: "[I]f the legislative goal was to extend partial tax credit to par-
ents who incur additional expenses in securing an education for their
children, . . . then this benefit should logically have been extended to
the parents of all school children in Ohio."8' Thus the addition of new
beneficiaries, when viewed in relation to the size of the sectarian subclass
of beneficiaries, did not alter the sectarian nature of the recipient class
taken as a whole.
The court reduced its analysis of the effect of the statute to the
breadth of the class of beneficiaries, which was found to be considerably
more narrow than the potentially relevant class:
[Where the affected class is predominantly religious or sectarian and
the benefits provided are not inherently ideologically neutral, as where
the state provides monetary grants to parents or institutions belonging
to a class that is essentially religious in character, then, as a matter of
law, the primary effect of such a statute is to advance religion, and the
7 8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5703.052, 5747.05 and 5747.111 (Page 1973). Although,
theoretically, the credit would not involve an affirmative state subsidy, excise, and sales taxes
in Ohio form the general revenue funds and are not in practice segregated to the account
of the individual taxpayer. Indeed, calculation of the individual's total tax liability would
be very nearly impossible.
70 353 F. Supp. at 762.
s0 A more complete list of those eligible for aid is set out in 353 F. Supp. at 750.
81Id. at 760.
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statute must be closely scrutinized for possible entanglement effects, pri-
marily in terms of political entanglement.82
The court once again misunderstood the tripartite nature of the test
established by Lemon, in which all three prongs must be separately met.
Having found that the tax program failed to meet the primary effect
test, the court needlessly proceeded to state that "Its validity can be up-
held against constitutional challenge only if the state can demonstrate
by dear and convincing evidence, that the political entanglement prob-
lems which customarily attach to a law that has such an effect will be
avoided."8' 3 It is interesting to note that, in declaring the program uncon-
stitutional primarily on political entanglement grounds-never solely re-
lied upon by the United States Supreme Court-the district court in Kosy-
dar foreclosed to the state its most effective means of refuting the political
entanglement objection: history. 4
In contrast to the application of Lemon by the district court was that
by the Ohio supreme court in Protestants and Other Americans United
for Separation of Church and State v. Essex 5 [hereinafter P.O.A.U. v.
Essex]. The Ohio General Assembly had instituted in 1967 a program
providing auxiliary services and materials to students in non-public
schools.8" That program, as effective between December 1, 1967 and
August 18, 1969, was upheld by a unanimous Ohio supreme court. Such
services and materials, the court found, "do not lend themselves to the
religious aura of the recipient sectarian schools ... [but rather] enhance
821d. at 753 (emphasis in the original).
83rd. at 762.
84 In Walz, it will be remembered, the Supreme Court took note of the fact that the
two centuries of history of tax exemption for church property had not resulted in an estab.
lishment of a state religion. In referring to alaz, Mr. Justice Rehnquist has remarked:
"[Ilf long-established use of a particular tax exemption scheme leads to a holding that
the scheme is constitutional, that holding should extend equally to newly devised tax benefit
plans which are indistinguishable in principle from those long established." Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 413 U.S. 756, 808 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
85 28 Ohio St. 2d 79,275 N.E.2d 603 (1971).
8 6s 0o REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.062 (Page 1972):
Moneys paid to school districts ... shall also be used to provide ... services and
materials to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the school district for: guid-
ance, testing, and counseling programs; programs for the deaf, blind, emotionally
disturbed, crippled, and physically handicapped children; audio-visual aids, speech
and hearing services; remedial reading programs; educational television services;
programs for the improvement of the educational and cultural status of disadvan-
taged pupils....
The pertinent statute was at that time OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(H) (Page Supp.
1970), since replaced by the present statute.
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only the secular educational process and that process is properly the con-
cern of the state.
s8 7
Ohio's auxiliary services program does not provide funding for the
teaching of basic core course. Nor are the grants made directly to the
parochial schools since state funds are paid to the public school districts
whose officials then contract for services to be provided directly to the
students.8" The materials provided under the program are lent to the
schools, but remain in the ownership of the state and may not be selected
for, used in, or especially suitable for use in sectarian religious courses
or devotional exercises. Further, the statute permits public school dis-
tricts to provide to students enrolled in parochial schools only those auxil-
iary services provided to students of the public schools in their districts.80
In dealing with the materials provided under the program, Ohio's
supreme court recognized that such provision would necessarily relieve
the parochial schools of the enormous cost of supplying such items as
audio-visual aids and equipment for speech and hearing and remedial
reading programs. However, the court felt that both Everson and Allen
permitted such indirect benefit to parochial schools since such materials
possess a negligible religious implication. Citing IWalz and Allen, the
court found that Ohio's materials program met the first two prongs of
the tripartite test: "[T]he supplying of costly teaching materials was not
seen either as manifesting a legislative purpose to aid or as having a
primary effect of aid contravening the First Amendment."10  In testing
the provision of materials in the light of the prohibition against excessive
administrative entanglement articulated in Lemon, the court in P.O.A.U.
87 28 Ohio St. 2d at 83,275 N.E.2d at 605.
88 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.02(D) (Page 1972) provides the general educational
appropriations to the various school districts and includes a specified amount based upon
the number of pupils attending the nonpublic schools of de districts to be used for the
services authorized in OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.062 (Page 1972).
88 This program was enacted as a part of the legislative scheme authorizing as well the
parental reimbursement grant program invalidated in Wolman. Although the auxiliary ser.
vices and materials program was not challenged in that case, the district court distinguished
the two programs on a preliminary basis. While the unconstitutional parental grants placed
no restrictions or guidelines upon their use, the services and materials provided were to
remain of a secular nature and were to be made available on a non.discriminatory basis,
not exceeding in cost or quality similar services provided in the public schools of the district,
342 F. Supp. at 403. The court also accorded peripheral approval of the program in holding
that:
Although Section 3317.062 contains no express severability clause, it is the opinion
of this Court that those aspects of the Section not challenged herein; and which
were upheld against constitutional challenge by the Ohio Supreme Court in
P.O.A.U. v. Essex, supra, are of continuing validity. "The cardinal principle of
statutory construction is to save and not to destroy." This Court's final order will
pay respect to this sound principle of constitutional adjudication.
342 F. Supp. at 419 n.27 (cited authorities omitted).
80 28 Ohio St. 2d at 83, 275 N.E.2d at 605.
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v. Essex emphasized the concept of excessiveness which forms the crux
of the third prong of the Establishment Clause test and found no greater
possibility of entanglement than that existing in the schemes of aid per-
missible under Everson and Allen: "To be sure, the contacts here are
greater than if no aid were extended at all, but we do not find that
degree of 'official and continuing surveillance,' or an initial excessive de-
gree of 'involvement,' in this act such as would render it constitutionally
objectionable."'" The state would make an initial inspection to assure
the secular nature of the materials provided, as was the procedure in
Allen. Under the statute, the State Board of Education is empowered
to reject applications for any items if doubt exists as to the possibility
of their use for religious purposes. The Ohio supreme court distin-
guished entanglement problems arising through the extensive auditing
and data inspection procedures present in Lemon from the periodic in-
spection procedure which would be made in any case to check the physi-
cal condition of the materials. -
In authorizing auxiliary services to nonpublic school children, Ohio's
program provides that all personnel involved be under contract to the
state and remain under the control of the local public school district,
a fact which the Ohio supreme court found "effectively negates the exis-
tence of 'religious control and discipline' as an element of the instant
case." 93  There should arise no greater danger of unconscious injection
of religious doctrine by a teacher participating in this program than with
that of any teacher in a public school. Further, in distinguishing Lemon's
invalidation of salary supplements paid to parochial schools for teachers
of secular courses, the Ohio supreme court emphasized the auxiliary na-
ture of the services provided:9" "It is difficult for us to perceive how
specialized services, attuned to the needs of the physically, emotionally,
91 Id. at 85, 275 N.E.2d at 606.
92The court failed to take note, however, of the United States Supreme Courts specific
approval in Tilton of the fact that contact with the colleges involved in that case was lim-
ited to a one-time undertaking.
93 28 Ohio St. 2d at 87,275 N.E.2d at 608.
94 The United States Supreme Court may have indicated disapproval of even auxiliary
aid in Lemon, however, in finding unconstitutional the Pennsylvania program providing
salary supplements to teachers of secular courses. Included as a course appropriate under
the program was physical education, a subject not generally regarded as one easily lending
itself to religious bias. More importantly, the Court struck down the entire program despite
an explicit severability clause included in the statute. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5608 (Purdon
Supp. 1973). It may be, however, that the Court regarded the focus of the aid as a program
-teachers' salaries-as too intimately involved with the total educational process of the
parochial schcols and thus not really separable from the regular curriculum and operations
of the schools: "Our decisions from Evcrson to Allen have permitted the states to provide
church-related schools with secular, neutral or non-ideological, services, facilities or materials."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 616.
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and culturally handicapped children of this state, could give rise to the
same fears of religious bias as might exist in an informal, day-to-day
teaching situation."95 This distinction is crucial in determining the pri.
mary effect of the legislation. Aid directed not toward the basic educa-
tional curriculum of the school but toward the particular problems of
particular students may not run the risk of identification of the state with
the religious activities or nature of the school. The Supreme Court of
the United States has long recognized the secular function of parochial
school education, but it held in Lemon that state subsidy of the teaching
of secular subjects is impermissible, since those subjects may be easily
and are often unconsciously transformed into vehicles of religious indoc-
trination. The Court has never held impermissible state aid in the form
of true public welfare to individuals in areas in which the sectarian func-
tion of the schools can be omitted. Indeed, Everson and Allen stand
for the contrary. Professor Giannella has suggested that one possible
test in determining whether a provided service constitutes a legitimate
child benefit might be,
whether the service is functionally so divisible from the regular curricu-
lum and operations of the school that its cost could be readily allocated
to those students utilizing it by means of a special charge. . . . Under
this more restricted test, textbook loans and bus rides could be easily jus-
tified, and a very good case could be made for the sending of public
school teachers into parochial schools for courses in remedial reading
and similar auxiliary services.90
The court in P.O.A.U. v. Essex failed entirely to address itself to
the possibility of divisive religious partisanship arising from the program
-a possibility to which the district court in WRolman and in Kosydar
directed so much attention. It has been argued in criticism of this failure
that the potential for political divisiveness arising from programs of aid
to parochial schools has already been realized in subsequent appropria.
tions and in the fact that funds originally appropriated for the invalidated
tuition reimbursement plan were reappropriated to the tax-credit plan
invalidated in Kosydar.7 It might also be argued that this political activ-
ity finds its origin in court decisions and stems, not from the religious
character of the beneficiary class, but from a determined attempt on the
part of the legislature to provide constitutionally acceptable aid to paro-
chial school children and to their families. Further, since the public
funds are included in the annual total appropriations to the State Depart-
9528 Ohio St. 2d at 87, 275 N.E.2d at 607-08.
06 Giannella, supra note 1, at 577.
o41 CNN. L. Riv. 694 (1972).
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ment of Education for auxiliary services and materials to be provided
to public and nonpublic school children alike,"' an argument can be made
that the political entanglement prohibition should present no obstacle
to the program. Since services and materials provided to parochial
school children may not exceed in cost or quality those provided public
school children, any political debate would most likely relate to the need
for and the merits of providing such services and materials to pupils
in general rather than to those in nonpublic schools in particular.
Lemon purported to establish a clear Establishment Clause test by
which to evaluate the constitutionality of state aid to parochial schools,
yet it left the contours of that test undefined. As l"ohnan, Kosydar and
P.O.A.U. v. Essex evidence, neither the tripartite nature of the test nor
its political aspects were widely understood. Further, while the United
States Supreme Court has never held that the first amendment prohibits
all aid, the Establishment Clause test articulated in Lemon provided no
clear guidelines by which state legislatives were able to fashion their own
actions. As a result, state legislatures continued to search for means of
providing constitutionally acceptable aid to parochial school education in
order to alleviate the effects upon the public schools of the economic
strain of parochial schools. In 1973, the United States Supreme Court
once again attempted to define the limits of the first amendment.
V. Nyquist: REFINEMENT OF THE PERSPECTIVE
In May, 1972, the New York legislature enacted an elaborate scheme
of financial aid to nonpublic school education. 9 Section One of the
act provided for direct money grants to "qualifying"100 nonpublic schools
to be used for maintenance and repair of facilities. Section Two provided
for tuition reimbursements to parents of nonpublic school children whose
annual taxable income was less than $5,000. Reimbursement could not
exceed fifty per cent of the actual tuition paid. Sections Three, Four, and
98OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(A) and (D) (Page 1972) provides for distribution
of payments to school districts for special programs including the cost of board and transpor-
ration required for physically or emotionally handicapped children attending regular or special
classes and an amount for each school district with guidance, testing, and counseling pro-
grams. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3318.17 (Page 1972) provides funds for the purchase
and lease of additional classroom facilities, including laboratory apparatus, supplies, tools
and other items of equipment for educational purposes. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 86.
99 N.Y. EDUC. LAW, §§ 549-553 (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.Y. EDtJc. LAW, §§ 559-
563 (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.Y. TAX LAW, §§ 612(c), 612(j) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
o10o Le., Serving a high concentration of pupils from low-income families for the purpose
of Tide IV of the Federal Higher Educ. Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 425 (1970). Payments
under Section One amounted to thirty dollars per pupil, or, if the facilities were more than
twenty-five years old, forty dollars per pupil. In no event was the grant to exceed fifty per
cent of equivalent per pupil cost in the public school systems.
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Five authorized deduction of a stipulated sum 'for each child attending
nonpublic schools from the adjusted gross income of parents whose an-
nual taxable income exceeded $5,000, but was less than $25,000. The
sum was unrelated to the actual amount of tuition paid, and decreased
as the taxable income increased. The stated legislative purposes in insti-
tuting these programs included concern for the safety and welfare of
the students attending nonpublic schools and a desire to make alternative
systems of education a viable choice to lower income classes. These pro-
grams were almost immediately challenged. The district court found the
first two programs unconstitutional, but upheld the validity of the tax
relief program.10'
In dealing with New York's statutory scheme, the Supreme Court
in Nyquist focused on the primary effect criterion of the tripartite test
and found that the statutes failed to meet it. Section One of the pro-
gram, authorizing direct money grants to qualifying nonpublic schools,
was an apparent legislative attempt to qualify under the "child benefit"
theory articulated in Everson and Allen. While limiting the grants to
maintenance and repairs, however, the legislation provided no mechanism
assuring that the funds would not be used for such sectarian purposes
as the renovation of classrooms in which religion would be taught. In-
deed, the Court was of the opinion that it would be impossible to so
restrict funds in a church-related school found by the Court to be unable
to separate its religious teaching from its secular teaching. Thus, absent
non-entangling restrictions, the grants constituted direct subsidy to reli-
gious activities, and such subsidies had as a primary and direct effect the
advancement of the religious mission of the schools. Not mentioned,
but certainly consistent with the Court's holding, was the possible adverse
public reaction to an obvious transfer of state funds to a religious school.
In dealing with the tuition reimbursement program authorized by
Section Two of the legislation, the Court remarked that if the money
allocated for such reimbursement were granted directly to the school in-
volved, as in Section One, such payments would clearly violate the E1stab-
lishment Clause, for the state had placed no restrictions upon its use. 1'0
Recognizing the "conduit" effect articulated in Wlolman, °t the Court
held that to make these payments to the parents made no constitutional
difference, since the effect of the aid was to provide financial support to
101 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655 (S,D,
N.Y. 1972).
102 But, of course, had the state placed restrictions upon the use of the funds, the consti-
tutionality of the statute would fail because of the entangling relationship between the school
and the state arising therefrom.
10 342 F. Supp. at 416.
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church-related schools. In attempting to distinguish tuition reimburse-
ments to parents from the programs upheld in Everson and in Allen,
the Court in Nyquist held that the school-parent distinction is only one
among many factors to be considered and is not itself determinative of
the question of constitutionality.1' 4 Rather, the Court said, Everson was
grounded on the ideologically neutral character of the aid provided. Bus
transportation, like police protection, can constitutionally be provided in
common to all citizens. Likewise, statutes authorizing the loan of only
secular textbooks, the aid provided in Allen, retain their neutral char-
acter. 05
New York took the position in Nyquist that the tuition reimburse-
ments were not violative of the Establishment Clause because there was
no element of coercion involved in the possible uses to which the reim-
bursements could be applied. Consequently, the state argued, it would
be mere speculation to suggest that the money would necessarily find
its way to parochial schools.' The Court, in response, cited Schempp as
holding that, while evidence of coercion might be pertinent to a claim
under the Free Exercise Clause, it was not a necessary element of a claim
under the Establishment Clause. 0 7  Rather the appropriate inquiry in an
Establishment Clause claim is whether a grant of public funds is offered
as an incentive to parents to send their children to church-related schools
whose sectarian and secular functions are inseparable. If so, then the
104 413 U.S. at 781.
105 In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), the Court held that the state of
Mississippi could not constitutionally lend textbooks to students of private schools with racial-
ly discriminatory polices. In distinguishing textbooks from generalized services which gov-
ernment might provide to such schools in common with others, the Court noted that text-
books are a form of assistance readily available from sources entirely independent of the
states-unlike the necessities of life. It must be noted, however, that state support is held
to a much stricter standard when private discrimination is involved than in a situation
where the internal tension within the Religion Clauses is involved.
106In Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), decided the same day as Nyquist, an
attempt was made to distinguish Pennsylvania's tuition reimbursement program from that
of New York. Argument was made before the Court that-unlike Pennsylvania's statutory
scheme-New York's tuition grants were available only to parents in an extremely low
income bracket. It would therefore be reasonable to predict that the grants would, in fact,
be used to pay the tuition, thus making certain that the parents were conduits of public
aid to religious fchools. Since Pennsylvania required no such income limitation, it was
argued, no assumption could be made as to how individual Pennsylvania parents would
spend their reimbursements. The Court was not impressed with this distinction and held
Pennsylvania's program unconstitutional as well.
1 oThis represents a rejection of the "No Imposition" standard reconciling the Religion
Clauses as articulated by Professor Alan Schwarz. His theory is that the Court has not
dealt with the underlying value of the Religion Clauses, i.e., protection from, the historical
fears of governmental imposition of religion upon unwilling citizens. Schwarz, supra note
11; Schwarz, The Nonestablishment Principle: A Reply to Professor Giannella, 81 HARV.
L REV. 1465 (1968).
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"substantive impact" of the grant is to advance the religious function
of those schools.'
A second argument proposed in support of the tuition reimburse-
ments was based upon a statistical guarantee of neutrality. Reimburse-
ment was limited to fifty per cent of the actual tuition paid. Since it
is estimated that tuition covers only thirty per cent of the total costs
of nonpublic education, the payments effectively provided only fifteen
per cent of the overall educational costs of the nonpublic school. Since
New York's education laws require that more than fifteen per cent of
school time be devoted to teaching secular courses, the grants, even if
paid totally to the parochial school, would not statistically have the effect
of advancing religion. The Court, however, had adopted in Lemon the
position that on the elementary and secondary levels neither teachers in
the parochial schools nor the schools themselves are able to segregate
their religious beliefs from their secular educational function. Thus the
Court in Nyquist rejected statistical assurances of neutrality; such a stan-
dard, it was felt, would permit the state to become directly involved in
the teaching of religion.10
The state's final argument was based upon the Free Exercise Clause.
The reasoning under this argument has developed over the years and
finds its roots in earlier holdings of the Court. Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters"0 recognized the right of parents to choose nonpublic education and
recognized as well the validity of the state's requirement that certain secu-
lar subjects be taught. In Sherbert v. Verner,"' the Court held that,
absent compelling state interests, South Carolina could not consistently
with the Free Exercise Clause withhold unemployment compensation
benefits to a claimant who refused to work on Saturday when to do so
would interfere with her observance of the Sabbath.
The Free Exercise argument in the context of public aid to parochial
schools has two premises: first, the government requires children to at-
tend school; and second, since there may be some sectarian parents who
believe that a cult of secularism pervades public schools to such an extent
that their religious convictions require that their children not be publical-
ly schooled," - state denial of aid to parents of those children would effec-
tively deny them the choice of parochial school education recognized in
108 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973).
10 Id. at 787.
110268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also West Virginia Bdcl. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
"l 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
112 Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme Cou.t, 14 LAW & CONT3MP. PROD.
73 (1949).
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Pierce.'13 While the Court in Nyquist recognized that affirmative state
interference with a parents' right to have their children educated in a
sectarian school would violate the Free Exercise Clause, neither the eco-
nomic burdens of the parents of those children nor admirable social goals
justify an "eroding of the limitations of the Establishment Clause now
firmly emplanted. '1114 Mr. Justice Powell's majority opinion put the Free
Exercise argument to rest in holding that the clause places on government
no affirmative duty to ensure that freedom of choice in religious matters
be protected from factors distinct from government, such as inflation,
rising costs of education and internal change in the structure of the reli-
gion. In Norwood v. Harrison,"5 the Court discussed in more detail
the rejection of claims arising under both the Free Exercise and the Equal
Protection Clauses:
We do not see the issue in appellees' terms. In Pierce, the Court
affirmed the right of private schools to exist and to operate; it said noth-
ing of any supposed right of private or parochial schools to share with
public schools in state largesse, on an equal basis or otherwise. It has
never been held that if private schools are not given some share of pub-
lic funds allocated for education that such schools are isolated into a
classification violative of the Equal Protection Clause. It is one thing to
say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and
quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protec-
tion, receive state aid.
The appellees intimate that the State must provide assistance to pri-
vate schools equivalent to that it provides to public schools .... Clearly,
the State need not. Even as to church-sponsored schools whose policies
are nondiscriminatory, any absolute right to equal aid was negated, at
least by implication, in Lemon v. Kurtzman .... The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment strictly confine state aid to sectarian education.
Even assuming, therefore, that the Equal Protection Clause might require
state aid to be granted to private nonsectarian schools in some circum-
stances-health care or textbooks, for example--a State could rationally
conclude as a matter of legislative policy that constitutional neutrality as
11
3 A variation of this line of reasoning, but brought under the Equal Protection Clause,
goes as follows: United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), appeared to have broadened
the definition of religion to include the philosophy of secular humanism. Thus, in effect,
the system of public school education has already violated the Establishment Clause in pro-
moting its own ,ecular humanism or -irreligion." The first amendment should therefore
be reinterpreted in light of this development, and the Court should recognize that neutrality
can only be achieved by !tate provision of equal support to both public and parochial school
systems. For a reection of this argument see Jackson v. California, 460 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.
1972); Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860 (Idaho 1971). But see Honohan v. Holt, 17 Ohio
Misc. 57, 244 N.E.2d 537 (Franklin Co. C.P. 1968); Hughes v. Board of Educ., 174 S.E.2d
711 (W. Va. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 944 (1971).
114 413 U.S. at 788-89.
"5413 U.S. 455 (1973).
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to sectarian schools might best be achieved by withholding all state assis-
tance.11
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent to Nyquist, did not take issue
with the majority finding that the Free Exercise Clause places no such
duty upon the state. However, he perceived the basic principle running
through the Establishnient Clause cases to be that the clause has no pro.
hibitive effect upon the state when legislation "moves away from direct
aid to religious institutions and takes on the character of general aid
to individual families. '"" 7 The deciding factor for the majority, he felt,
was not the form of the aid, but rather the religious nature of the possible
beneficiaries and the percentage of persons choosing to use the money
for religious purposes.""
Sections Three, Four, and Five of the New York scheme provided tax
relief to parents whose adjusted gross income exceeded the limit for eligi-
bility for tuition reimbursement but was less than $25,000. The amount
of the deduction was unrelated to the amount of money actually ex-
pended by the parent, but was calculated according to a formula con-
tained within the statute itself. In constructing the formula, the legisla-
ture attempted to ensure that each family would receive a carefully esti-
mated net benefit (although not one equal to their total expenditures)
and that the tax benefit would be comparable to the tuition grant for
the lower income families."' The Court again refused to determine the
constitutionality of the program on the basis of the form of the aid;
instead it again looked to the substantive impact of that aid and saw
no difference between the ultimate effect of the tax benefit allowed under
Sections Three, Four, and Five and the tuition grant of Section Two.2 0
In support of its tax program, New York relied upon Walz. The
Court, in response, distinguished Walz on two grounds: first, that of the
historical status quo of the property tax exemption; and, second, the con-
stitutional ground of government neutrality toward religion. Whereas
property tax exemption had been accorded to religious organizations in
all fifty states and congressional' enactments exempting such organizations
go back to at least 1802, the Court found no s;uch historical basis for
11 Id. at 462.
"7 413 U.S. at 802.
118 "And the larger the class of recipients, the greater the pressure for accelerated in-
creases." Id. at 797.
119 In his dissent, Mr. Justice Rehnquist saw New York's program as being analogous
to the standard deduction in the INTERNAL REVENUE CODi which likewise has no relation
to actual expenditures. The New York program, in his view, remained consistent with the
concept of "benevolent neutrality" in its attempt to give lower income families greater free-
dom in exercising their religion. ld. at 810.
120 Id. at 790-91.
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New York's-or any state's-innovative tax relief program for parents
of parochial school children. As the district court stated, "[A) State-
supported church school is simply not a part of our way of life, and
the payment of tuition for its pupils makes the church school a State-
supported school.""'- The Supreme Court did not, however, reduce its
determination in Walz or in Nyquist merely to an historical analysis.
Recognizing that the power to tax has historically been seen as a tool
of oppression, the Court in Walz felt that the principle of neutrality
toward religion required that exemption of religious organizations from
taxation be upheld as constitutional: "Thus, if taxation was regarded as
a form of 'hostility' toward religion, 'exemption constitute[ld] a reason-
able and balanced attempt to guard against those dangers.' "12'_. In short,
the Court in Nyqiuist found attempted analogies to Wlalz unpersuasive.
New York's statute providing tax deductions to parents of parochial
school children was more properly analogized to the tuition reimburse-
ment plan in substantive impact. Neither form, the Court held, was
sufficiently restricted to assure that they would not have the impermissible
effect of advancing religious schools. 12 3
Because its holding was based upon the finding that New York's pro-
grams failed to meet the primary effect test, the majority made no specif-
ic finding with regard to the possibility of administrative entanglement
between the schools and the state. It did, however, make certain that
it was not abandoning the excessive entanglement test enunciated in
Lemon. Reiterating the differentiation between the normal "political di-
versity expected in a democratic society" and "political division along
religious lines [which] was one of the principal evils against which the
First Amendment was intended to protect,' 2 -1 4 the Court speculated that
the maintenance and repair and the tuition reimbursement programs
would require continuing annual appropriations. As for the tax deduc-
tion program, the majority felt that, while beginning at modest levels,
demands for increases would undoubtedly ensue. All three programs,
therefore, would necessarily entangle the political processes in relations
"a'1350 F. Supp. at 669.
122 413 U.S. at 793. It seems, however, that this, too, is a "tatus quo" argument. 'Why
is taxation of parochial school parents in support of public schools not seen as hostility if not
because, historically, they have always been so taxed?
123 Id. at 794. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, found it impossible to reconcile
the majority's holding with IValz, where it was noted that abstention from taxation involved
no transfer of revenue to churches. He saw the New York program as even further attenu-
ated in that it provided for only a partial deduction, and tax benefit went not directly
to churches or to their schools--which perform admittedly secular functions-but to parents,
who are free to use it as they see fir. Id. at 807.
124 Id. at 796 n.54.
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with church-related institutions. The Court, wisely, was not prepared
to make its nebulous concept of political entanglement by itself a deter-
mining factor in passing upon the constitutionality of state aid to parochi-
al schools; yet it was not willing to abandon it: "And while the prospect
of such divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws
that otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required by the decisions of
this Court, it is certainly a 'warning signal' nol: to be ignored."' 125
Since Lemon, it is clear that the Court's treatment of governmental
aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools is ultimately grounded
upon its view of the nature of those schools. Because the Court finds
the admittedly secular functions of parochial schools to be inextricably
entwined with their sectarian functions, any aid flowing in whatever form
to the educational operations of those schools will have the effect of ad-
vancing their religious mission. In Nyquist, the Court has shown how
attenuated that aid may be and yet still have the primary, i.e., unaccept-
able, effect of advancing religion. Unconstitutional aid need not pass
directly to the schools, nor need it purport to subsidize wholly the opera-
tions of those schools. So long as the substantive impact of the aid is to
assist the operations of the schools, it will be held to offend the Establish-
ment Clause. "The problem, like many problems in constitutional law,
is one of degree."'' O
VI. THE RAMIFICATIONS or Nyquist
In light of the trend that began with Lemon and continued in Ny.
quist, the future of public aid to parochial schools looks bleak indeed.
The tripartite test has effectively produced a "Scylla-Charybdis" situa-
tion'17 in which proponents of pablic aid to private education can take
little comfort. In his bitter dissent to Nyquist, Mr. Justice White makes
clear that he not only sees no constitutional barrier to such aid, but also
believes that failure to provide state aid may result in the ultimate demise
of parochial school education:
There is no doubt here that Pennsylvania and New York have sought
in the challenged laws to keep their parochial schools system alive and
capable of providing adequate secular education to substantial numbers
of students. This purpose satisfies the Court, even though to rescue
schools that would otherwise fail will inevitably enable those schools to
continue whatever religious functions they perform. By the same token,
it seems to me, preserving the secular functions of these schools is the
125 Id. at 798.
126 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
127 Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Oakey, 339 F. Supp. 545, 550
(D. Vt. 1972).
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overriding consequence of these laws and the resulting, but incidental,
benefit to religion should not invalidate them. 28
In theory, at least, some aid is constitutionally permissible:
[Wjhere carefully limited so as to avoid the prohibitions of the "ef-
fect" and "entanglement" tests, States may assist church-related schools
in performing their secular functions, . ..not only because the States
have a substantial interest in the quality of education being provided by
private schools, . . .but more importantly because assistance properly
confined to the secular functions of sectarian schools does not substantial-
ly promote the readily identifiable religious mission of those schools and
it does not interfere with the free exercise rights of others.'
Implicit in this statement is a formula by which both quantitative and
qualitative limits may be placed upon parochial school funding by the
states. The test is expressed in terms of degree: legislation must not
have the primary effect of advancing religion, nor can it result in exces-
sive entanglement. Thus, in applying the test, the Court looks not solely
to the form of the aid-whether active or passive, as in grants as opposed
to tax credits, or direct or indirect, as in aid to schools as opposed to
parents-but also to the substantive impact of that aid upon the church-
related school as well. The dilemma facing the Court in this area is
a difficult one, illustrated by opposing positions taken in Nyquist. While
Mr. Justice White in his dissent feared the possibility of the total collapse
of the parochial schools, the majority feared the possibility that state ac-
tion might assure their continued existence. The decision in that case
indicates that the Court, at least for the present, will resolve this dilemma
by seeking to prohibit the very aid that may make the difference between
survival and extinction for those schools. The reason for this choice
is that such aid would, to the public eye, amount to state sponsorship
of religion by effectively incorporating the parochial schools into the pub-
lic school systems without a change in their religious character.
The recent programs proposed by the various state legislatures are
attempt-for secular purposes, to be sure-to keep the parochial school
systems alive. Programs providing bus transportation to parochial school
children are not sufficient, nor is the lending of textbooks to those chil-
dren. Subsidies of teacher salaries, tuition reimbursements, and tax relief
just may, however, keep those schools alive. The former are constitu-
tional; the latter are not. The basic proposition which has emerged in
the context of public aid to elementary and secondary sectarian schools
is that any state aid which is necessary to their survival will amount
to state sponsorship of their religious character. It is for this reason
128 413 U.S. at 823-24.
129Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468 (1973).
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that the Court, through its tripartite Establishment Clause test, looks not
to the mechanics of the governmental aid, but rather to the substantive
impact of that aid upon the church-related institution. "[A] little aid
is all right, but a lot is unconstitutional."' 130
The primary effect test will undoubtedly remain central to the con-
cept of neutrality. However, so long as the Court articulates the entan-
glement test in terms of state administrative surveillance,' 81 fiscal audit-
ing, and fragmentation of the body politic, it will remain a meaningless,
if not unmanageable concept, circling around but never reaching the
heart of the Establishment Clause. Its recent emergence as an added
dimension to the Establishment Clause test has iesulted in seemingly ir-
reconcilable case law. -32  Viewed from a public perspective, however, a
common thread can be seen to run through the cases dealing with aid
to parochial schools.
It should make no constitutional difference per se whether govern-
mental authority must come into contact with a church-related college
just once in order to effectuate its program, as the Court assumed in
Tilton, or once a month to see that the parochial school is not construct-
ing a chapel with state maintenance and repair funds. The real differ-
ence lies in what the Court perceives to be the substantially greater reli-
gious character of the sectarian elementary and secondary schools. Con-
tinuing and extensive interaction between the state and the school runs
the risk of identifying the two in the public's eye. While Everson may
be explained in terms of child welfare and family benefit, the Court in
Nyquist did not adopt the Chief Justice's position that New York's tuition
reimbursement plan was constitutional as a general welfare program. The
difference between the two programs is that providing bus transportation
has, from the public perspective, a minimal effect upon the operations
of a church-related school, but tuition reimbursement may, from the same
perspective, be seen as being substantially responsible for the continued
operation of that school. It cannot be denied that such was the hoped-
for- result of New York's legislation. Likewise, the Court in lWalz upheld
property tax exemption for church property because to hold otherwise
could only be read, from the public perspective, as a newly-developed
hostility toward religion. To allow, however, substantial state funding
13 OHaskell, The Prospects for Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 MINN. L. Riv 159,
181 (1971).
1a1 It is readily admitted that the state is involved in surveillance of the parochial schools:
"[Slubstantially all non-public schools in Ohio have been inspected during the past school
year to insure compliance with minimal educational standards established by the State Board
of Education." Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D. Ohio 1972), afl'd., 409
U.S. 808 (1972).
132 See supra note 60.
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of private education through tax relief programs after a long history with-
out such funding could only be seen as affirmative sponsorship of parochi-
al education. The Court's opinions should not be read to mean that
teachers in elementary and secondary parochial schools cannot be trusted
to keep religion out of their lectures. Rather, since from the public per-
spective they participate in an operation inherently religious, their posi-
tion and functions cannot be separated from the atmosphere in which
they teach. For the state to participate in that educational process in
a substantial manner, as through salary supplements or through tuition
reimbursements, is to identify the state with that inherently religious op-
eration. Further, to require parochial schools to omit the element of
religion from their educational functions would be to require that they
compromise their religious character.
State legislatures and parochial schools still must grapple with the
serious problems confronting those schools. To date, every attempt to
provide substantial aid aimed at alleviating their problems and facilitating
their continued operations has been invalidated. In its recent treatment
of aid to parochial schools, however, the Supreme Court has dealt directly
only with attempts by state legislatures to provide either aid intimately
serving the overall functions of the parochial schools, such as teacher
salary supplements and general economic aid to parents of parochial
school children, or aid granted directly to the schools involved, such as
New York's maintenance and repair grants. Although the options open
to the states have been severely curtailed, it is unlikely that attempts
to aid parochial schools and their students will cease altogether.
In dealing with such attempts, it must be remembered that the three
prongs of the tripartite test do not constitute ends in themselves; they
have been constructed to effectuate what the Court perceives to be the
heart of the Establishment Clause, i.e., protection against sponsorship by
and active involvement of the state in religious activities. Mechanical
application of the test could result in the invalidation of aid which does
not offend this value. To lose sight of the tension within the first amend-
ment unnecessarily runs the risk, not of identifying the state with the
religious activity, but of expressing a hostility towards participants in pa-
rochial school education.
VII. OHIO'S AuxImARY SERVICES AND
MATERIALS PROGRAM: APPLICATION Or THE PERSPECTIVE
The Ohio General Assembly on August 15, 1973, allocated a supple-
mental appropriation13 3 to the program 34 providing auxiliary services and
13 3 H.B. 993, 110th Gen'l. Assembly (1973).
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materials to nonpublic education upheld by the Ohio supreme court in
P.O.A.U. v. Essex. The additional moneys, providing over $81 million
over the next two years, were the same funds previously appropriated
to the tuition reimbursement and tax credit programs invalidated in IW/ol-
man and Kosydar. A challenge to this supplemental appropriation and
to the original program has been filed in the same district court which
held invalid Ohio's previous attempts to aid parochial school education.18
The auxiliary nature of the services authorized by the program is
crucial to the question of constitutionality. The majority in Nyquist re-
jected the argument that tuition reimbursement and tax credits provided
to lower income families were mere social welfare programs, since the
funds involved could effectively be channelled into the general operation-
al funds of the parochial schools. However, services in the areas of guid-
ance, testing, and counseling programs for the deaf, blind, emotionally
disturbed, crippled, and physically handicapped children in nonpublic
schools do not form an intimate part of the basic curriculum and educa-
tional operations of such schools. Speech therapy addressed to a particu-
lar child is not a vehicle for religious indoctrination. Nor is remedial
reading instruction (so long as the materials used remain secular) primar-
ily an aspect of a child's spiritual development. These programs are,
rather, therapeutic services directed toward alleviating a particular child's
handicaps. Although guidance, testing and counseling programs would
not exist in isolation with respect to a child's education, there is a qualita-
tive difference between state support of a core curriculum and state provi-
sion of auxiliary services. Unlike the presentation of a basic educational
curriculum in an atmosphere of Christian thought, programs addressed
primarily to a particular child's physical health and welfare do not form
the underlying goal of parochial school education. Thus the nature of
the services provided under the program could be characterized as pri-
marily neutral, with only that degree of advancement of, and entangle-
ment with, religion that was present in Everson and Allen.
Both Everson and Allen, however, may be distinguished on the
ground that the statutes upheld in those cases provided for aid to be
granted to students in public and nonpublic schools alike. Ohio's statu.
tory program, on the other hand, is directed to a class primarily limited
to members of one sect.130 The district court in Kosydar was of the
opinion that such a statute, conferring even secular and non-ideological
134 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.062 (Page 1972). For -text see supra note 86.
13 5 Wolman v. Essex, Civil Action No. 73-292 (S.D. Ohio, liled July 26, 1973).
136 Although, it must be remembered, other statutes authorize provision of similar ser.
vices and materials to public schools and to their pupils. OHIO REV. CODE ANN, § 3317.06
(A), (D) (Page 1972); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3318.17 (Page 1972). Supra note 98.
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aid, will, as a matter of law, have the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion.' * The ramifications of such an opinion are unclear, however, for
the court went on to hold that a statute found to have such an effect
will be upheld against constitutional challenge if the state can demon-
strate by clear and convincing evidence that the entanglement objections
which customarily attach to such a law will be avoided.13 8 Although
this program does not present another Walz situation, it can safely be
said that seven years of operation have not to date resulted in a state-
established religion or system of religious education.
A more questionable ground of objection to a limited class of bene-
ficiaries' was presented in Klinger v. Howlett"' where the Illinois su-
preme court held unconstitutional legislation 40 appropriating $20 mil-
lion to provide textbooks and auxiliary services"' to parents of nonpublic
school children. Like the Ohio program, the Illinois funds were to be
paid to the local school districts. In a surprising opinion, the Illinois
court found that the legislation had created a state subsidy which was
unavailable to other sectors of the population. Where the cost of these
services to public school students is borne by the taxpayer of the local
school district, the cost of the same services to nonpublic students is borne
by the taxpayer of the state. As a result, parents of nonpublic students
received an economic benefit to the exclusion of other parents. The ma-
jority failed to reveal how such objection related to the Establishment
Clause test, and, as the dissent pointed out, if an equal protection objec-
tion does indeed exist, it would not find its basis in the Establishment
Clause. The Illinois court unfortunately relied upon recent United States
Supreme Court decisions without distinguishing the qualitative nature of
the programs involved. Sloan v. Lemon142 invalidated a tuition subsidy
as an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools; Le-
vitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Libert' 43 invalidated
a statute providing reimbursement to nonpublic schools for the cost of
administering tests. The Court found that the overwhelming majority
137 Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 762 n.22.
-1381d. at 762.
139 305 N.E.2d 129 (1973).
140 122 ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1022 (Supp. 1972).
141 The court perceived two types of services authorized by the legislation: (1) school
health services, consisting of services by physicians, surgeons, nurses, dentists and podiatrists;
and (2) guidance and counseling services, remedial reading, and therapeutic programs. The
court saw the first category as purely secular, but saw the second as not susceptible of super-
vision to assure secular content. It appears from the dissent, however, that the majority did
not consider that these latter services would be furnished and controlled by the local school
district and would thus be free of the influence of the nonpublic school.
142 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
143 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
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of tests involved were those drafted by the nonpublic teacher and admin-
istered as part of the basic core curriculum. Sloan itself distinguished
forms of aid conferring similar secular benefits to all families from aid
resulting in sponsorship of the religious school. 144 The Illinois court in
Klinger lost sight of the value underlying the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. If medical services to nonpublic school students
-admitted by the Illinois court to be secular and free of entangling
ramifications-offends the Establishment Clause, it is difficult if not im-
possible to conceive of valid state aid which the United States Supreme
Court insists theoretically exists. 145
An entanglement problem arises in the Ohio auxiliary services pro-
gram because public school personnel will be sent into the parochial
schools. McCollum v. Board of Education140 held unconstitutional a pro-
gram permitting parochial school personnel to enter public school build-
ings to conduct religion courses. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State v. Oakey147 applied the principle of McColhm and
held unconstitutional Vermont statutes appropriating to the local school
districts funds with which to hire teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic
schools. 148  The court in that case found inadequate the fact that the
teachers would be under contract to the school district; indeed, that fact
only served to exacerbate the entangling confrontation between the
school and the state, for, the court surmised, there would develop within
the nonpublic school a segment of personnel whose loyalties would run
contrary to the school's administration. 4 ' Further, because the program
provided the school districts with the power to determine the educational
needs of the parochial school students, secular authorities would perforce
become intimately involved with the shaping of the policies of that
school, thus compromising the integrity of both the school and the state.
The Oakey court took note, too, of the atmosphere of religion which
would pervade even the physical plant of the school and objected to
the subtle effect that such surroundings may have on the state-hired teach-
144 Id. at 832.
145The United States Supreme Court has stated that a legislature could rationilly with.
hold secular health care and textbooks from nonpublic students on the ground that neutrality
might best be achieved in this manner. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973).
This determination is a matter of legislative policy, however, and not for the court.
146 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
147 339 F. Supp. 545 (D. Vt. 1972). See also Americans United for Separation of
Church & State v. Paire, 348 F. Supp. 506 (D. N.1. 1972).
148 16 V.S.A §§ 3441, 3445, 3471(3), (4) (Supp. 1973).
140 The court, however, also found a potsibility of an impermissible fostering of religion,
because: "Once within the church school . . . the instruction would become subject to pres.
sures which the Court has warned us would make religious neutrality extremely difficult."
339 F. Supp. at 553.
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ers. A more persuasive argument would be that, from a public perspec-
tive, the public school system had become physically identified with the
religious nature of the educational operations in the parochial school.
Yet these programs are not precisely analogous to the Ohio program
because of the auxiliary nature of the services provided under the latter.
Whereas in McCollum and in Oakey the states had become physically
identified with the teaching of religion, under the Ohio program the state
enters the parochial school for an entirely different purpose. Administra-
tion of therapeutic services within the parochial school is not entwined
with that school's religious function except insofar as the building exists.
The state's substantial involvement in such services does not run the risk
of identification of the state with the religious character of the school,
just as the state does not become identified through the inspections which
must be made in order to grant charters and accreditation to those
schools. Further, it cannot be denied that, as a practical matter, nonpub-
lic school children can benefit from these public welfare services only
if the programs physically reach the schools which they are now attend-
ing.
In Tilton, the Court did not find objectionable the expenditure of
federal funds to construct a building forming an integral part of the
physical structure of a church-sponsored school. The basis of that deci-
sion was that government funds would not become involved in the reli-
gious mission of the institution since the Court had found that the sec-
tarian and secular functions of schools at the higher levels of education
were separable even as to the basic educational curriculum. On the other
hand, the Court has found the purpose of parochial school education at
the lower levels to be the molding of the child's religious development
through the basic educational curriculum. Following this reasoning,
therefore, while state aid in areas of the parochial school's basic curricu-
lum would necessarily involve the state in the religious function of that
school, there should be no constitutional objection to state aid in areas
where the state does not intrude upon that function.
In addition to auxiliary services, the Ohio program authorizes the
loan of secular materials to nonpublic schools. Because such aid is
granted directly to the schools for use in the curriculum, it has much
less constitutional support and may prove fatal to the auxiliary services
program. 5' In upholding this provision, the Ohio supreme court in
150 The court in lVolman struck down the parental reimbursement program despite the
fact that the grants covered the cost not only of tuition but of transportation and textbooks
as well:
However, this Court is not able to sever those aspects of parental reimbursement
grants which may be constitutionally permissible (textbooks, transportation) from
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P.O.A.U. v. Essex found the preliminary determination of the appro-
priateness of the materials was sufficient to ensure their secular use. In
its analysis, however, the court failed to consider the continuing surveil-
lance problems inherent in the use of such materials in the parochial
schools. While no court would presume that parochial school personnel,
having agreed not to use such materials in religious instruction, would
fail to abide by that agreement, one could point to the possibility of
unconscious injection of religion (either through the teacher or through
the surrounding physical atmosphere of the church-related school) while
using the state-provided materials. Yet the even greater possibility of
such entanglement was apparently acceptable in Allen, in which a statute
authorizing the loan of textbooks-which constituted the heart of the
core curriculum-was upheld. One possible ground for distinguishing
Allen (other than the fact that the statute in that case was directed to
all students) is the fact that, in that case, the materials were lent to
the students rather than to the schools, as the Ohio program provides.
Yet, whether lent to schools or to children, the effect of the statute re-
fiiains the same, and, as the Court held in Nyquist, such a distinction
is not itself determinative of the question of constitutionality.
It is uncontroverted that the moneys appropriated in August may be
characterized as "vast and unprecedented,"' 15 1 and an interesting question
arises whether or not the supplementary appropriation changes the char-
acter of the program. Prior to the supplementary appropriation, the
public school districts had available to them roughly twelve dollars per
nonpublic school child, an amount insufficient to cover even one-tenth
of the cost of providing only a remedial reading teacher hired by the
school district to provide services to nonpublic school children, In prac-
tice, therefore, services authorized by the program where "available only
to the largest of schools where the per-pupil funding was insufficient
to offset the cost of specialists hired by the public school districts.' 15 2
The supplementary allocation would raise the funding to $150 per pupil.
those which are clearly unconstitutional (tuition). . . . First, neither the statute nor
its guidelines impose enforceable standards for the apportionment of these funds
among the various allowed purposes. Therefore, individual schools have almost
complete discretion as to how such grants may be allocated. Second, it is not, en-
tirely clear that even those funds which are allocated for the purchase of secular
textbooks or transportation are constitutionally valid. , . . Since Section 3317.062
supplies even this secular and non-ideological aid because of the recipients' religious
status and affiliation, it may be invalid. We intimate no opinion as to the consti.
tutionality of the non-tuition aspects of the Ohio scheme if they were made to con.
form, in terms of breadth of class, to the statutes upheld in Ewerson and Allen,
342 F. Supp. at 419 n.27.
151 Complaint at 7.
152 Memorandum of Intervening Defendants contra Motion for Temporary Rellc at 2, 3.
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The only difference between the program as originally funded and as
presently funded is its possible effectiveness. The appropriation, provid-
ing $40 million per year for the next two years, may arguably be seen
as a legislative attempt to provide aid in an amount sufficient to assure
the continuation of the nonpublic schools. Yet, if the qualitative nature
of the auxiliary aid is such that it cannot assure such continuation, the
quantitative nature of the aid should not be determinative.15  Since the
provision of auxiliary educational materials does not alleviate the prob-
lem which may be the most pressing-the salaries of teachers of the
basic curriculum courses-it is unlikely that the program will ultimately
be determinative of the continued financial viability of those schools.
Further, the services provided to the students will not substantially free
parochial school money for use in their religious functions, for few, if
any, parochial schools presently provide these services out of their own
funds.154  The primary beneficiaries of the program will be the children
who are in need of such services and who are not presently receiving
them.
One should hesitate to place excessive reliance upon Allen in arguing
the validity of the statute, for the court has indicated that its holding
in that case may be quite narrow:
Nor can we fail to see that in constitutional adjudication some steps,
which when taken were thought to approach "the verge," have become
the platform for yet further steps. A certain momentum develops in
constitutional theory and it can be a "downhill" thrust easily set in mo-
tion yet difficult to retard or stop.155
Many objections to this program may be raised. But the test, it will
be recalled, is articulated in terms of degree. Mechanical application
of that test may fail to serve the value it is meant to protect. A court
must look to the substantive impact of the program upon the school;
if its intended consequence is to preserve and to sponsor the church-re-
lated school, then its effect is to identify the state with the religious ac-
tivities of that school. If, on the other hand, the program can reasonably
be seen primarily as a design to ensure the general health and welfare
of children who happen to attend nonpublic schools, then a court should
not deny them those benefits simply because their parents have chosen
to freely exercise their religious beliefs.
Norah C. McCann
153The guidelines for the implementation of the program provide that funds unencum-
bered and unexpended at the dose of the second year of the biennium shall be returned
to the State Treasurer.
154 Memorandum of Intervening Defendants contra Motion for Temporary Relief at 5.
155 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971).
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